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Abstract
India embarked on reintegration with the world econ-
omy in the early 1990s. At rst, a certain limited open-
ing took place emphasising equity ows by certain kinds
of foreign investors. This opening has had myriad in-
teresting implications in terms of both microeconomics
and macroeconomics. A dynamic process of change in
the economy and in economic policy then came about,
with a co-evolution between the system of capital con-
trols, macroeconomic policy, and the internationalisa-
tion of rms including the emergence of Indian multi-
nationals. Through this process, de facto openness has
risen sharply. De facto openness has implied a loss of
monetary policy autonomy when exchange rate pegging
was attempted. The exchange rate regime has evolved
towards greater exibility.
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21 From autarky to reintegration
India's integration into the world economy blossomed in the
First Globalisation. The trade/GDP ratio rose from 1 to 2 per
cent in 1800 to 20 per cent in 1914. In 1940, when India was un-
der colonial rule, restrictions on international trade and capital
mobility were imposed throughout the Sterling Area as wartime
measures. India gained independence in 1947, but emphasised
autarkic policies, with a marked closing of the economy in the
1960s and 1970s. By 1970, the trade/GDP ratio had dropped
to 8 per cent.
By 1991, with experience and international comparisons for 44
years in hand, the intellectual and policy consensus shifted against
autarky. India then embarked on reintegration into the world
economy through trade and capital account liberalisation. By
the mid 1990s, the trade/GDP ratio had got back to the 20 per
cent value seen in 1914. Reintegration into the world economy
took place on both the current account and on the capital ac-
count. The early initiatives in capital account decontrol were
based on three ideas:
 It was believed that debt inows and all outows were
dangerous; hence strong restrictions against debt inows
and all outows were kept in place.
 It was believed that inows into the equity market were
benecial, but only if they originated from certain kinds of
investors. Thus investment vehicles such as pension funds
and university endowment funds were considered good,
while hedge funds and individuals were considered bad.
Hence, a limited opening was undertaken, where certain
kinds of `foreign institutional investors' (FIIs) were able
to register in India with the securities regulator, and then
given substantial exibility including the lack of quantita-
tive restrictions.
3 While the ocial rhetoric was in favour of FDI, the re-
moval of capital controls against FDI was limited in many
sectors. Deeper liberalisation of capital controls against
FDI took place later.
This opening of the economy was a key element of India's growth
acceleration of the early 1990s. The combination of these re-
forms of the capital account, and trade liberalisation, unleashed
a complex dynamic of change in the economy and in economic
policy.
In this setting, the analysis of India's reintegration into the
world economy is usefully organised around the following key
questions. What were the microeconomic and macroeconomic
consequences of this partial opening? How did capital account
and current account opening interact with each other? What dy-
namic of change was unleashed in the political economy through
the map of interests of gainers and losers associated with this
mechanism of opening the economy? How did de facto open-
ness evolve in the following two decades? While the bulk of
these questions remain unanswered research puzzles, there is
clarity on some sub-components of this larger picture, which is
sketched in the following sections.
2 Empirical facts about reintegration
Direct reductions in customs duties which were spread over the
period from 1991 till 2003 led to a rapid and sharp rise in trade.
Trade also grew in response to reductions in transactions costs of
transportation, and to the emergence of tradeable services based
on computer and telecommunications technologies. Combining
these, gross ows on the current account, expressed as per cent
of GDP, grew dramatically from 8 per cent in 1990, to 31 per
cent in 2000 and 71 per cent in 2008.
In terms of de jure capital account restrictions, the Chinn-Ito
4measure, which measures whether there were any segment where
restrictions were completely removed, showed no change at -
1.13 through the entire period. Within each restricted segment
and market many steps in liberalisation did take place. This
reects the fact that the Chinn-Ito methodology, which is based
on the IMF areaer data, tends to portray India as closed,
given the bureaucratic procedures which encumber all aspects
of the Indian capital account. The Chinn-Ito result { of an
unchanged score of -1.13 through the period { is correct in a
cross-sectional sense, in that India's capital account restrictions
are more onerous than those used in most emerging markets.
At the same time, in a time-series sense, India is signicantly
more open on a de jure basis in 2010 when compared with 1990,
which is not shown by the Chinn-Ito measure.
The de facto capital account integration measured by the Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti database showed little change from 1990 to
2000, with a gross investment position (excluding ocial re-
serves) growing from 30 per cent of GDP in 1990 to only 42
per cent of GDP in 2000. However, signicant change was visi-
ble after that, with a value of 85 per cent in 2007. This marked
acceleration of capital account integration after roughly 2000
recurs repeatedly in the discussion ahead.
The Lane and Milesi-Ferretti data understates capital account
integration to the extent that economic agents engage in ille-
gal capital account transactions, which appears to be a signi-
cant issue in India. There is some evidence of Indian residents
holding signicant assets outside the country, and evidence of
a signicant scale of misinvoicing on the trade account. While
the literature has focused on evasion of customs duties as the
rationale for misinvoicing, the Indian evidence shows no signi-
cant change in misinvoicing across a sharp reduction in customs
duties. This suggests a role for misinvoicing in the evasion of
capital controls.
5Five-year averages, percent to GDP
Debt Debt Debt FDI FDI
Year Aid Non-aid Total Inward Outward Portfolio Other Total
1955 0.09 0.09 -0.09 -0.02
1960 0.65 0.65 0.25 1.16
1965 1.68 1.68 0.02 1.88
1970 1.98 1.98 -0.01 2.03
1975 0.45 0.10 0.54 -0.08 0.63
1980 1.02 0.15 1.16 -0.41 0.78
1985 0.63 0.31 0.94 -0.10 1.56
1990 0.75 0.62 1.37 0.20 2.00
1995 0.82 0.89 1.72 0.18 0.55 0.41 2.65
2000 0.26 0.99 1.24 0.72 0.59 0.11 2.19
2005 -0.11 1.13 1.02 1.02 -0.32 0.95 0.16 2.73
2010 0.20 1.86 2.06 2.49 -1.34 1.25 0.11 4.55
Table 1: Composition of capital ows
2.1 Composition of capital ows
Table 1 shows the composition of capital ows. Each value
shown in the table is expressed as per cent to GDP, and rep-
resents the average over the latest ve years. As an example,
the value for 1955 is the average of the ve years leading up to
1954-55. In each column, the largest value is shown in boldface.
In the early years, international nancial integration was dom-
inated by ocial assistance. Aid amounted to 1.68 per cent
of GDP in 1961-1965, and 1.98 per cent of GDP in 1966-1970.
These accounted for the bulk of the net capital ows in these
years. Aid declined steadily therafter, and shows negligible val-
ues after 1995, reecting the onset of international nancial in-
tegration through the private sector.
Capital account decontrol took place in three phases. The rst
phase involved borrowing by the private sector, which was rst
visible in the ve years ended 1975. This borrowing has risen
steadily through this period, attaining a value of 1.86 per cent
of GDP for 2006-2010. Since this rise went alongside a decline
6of aid, the rise in overall borrowing has appeared subdued: the
total debt inow of 2.06 per cent of GDP for 2006-2010 is similar
to the value of 1.98 per cent of GDP for 1966-1970.
In the early 1990s India faced a balance of payment crisis. This
crisis was followed by an IMF structural adjustment program,
economic reforms and liberalisation of the trade and capital
accounts. Policy makers were, however, very cautious about
opening up the economy to debt ows. The experience of the
BOP crises as well as the lessons learnt from other developing
countries suggested that debt ows, especially short term debt
ows could lead to BOP diculties if the country faced macroe-
conomic imbalances and had an inexible exchange rate. The
emphasis was, therefore, on foreign investment - both FDI and
portfolio investment. Even these were opened up slowly and a
complex administrative system of capital controls remained in
place. Within foreign investment, the attempt was to continue
within the infant industry argument support for domestic indus-
try. Consequently, while equity markets, which allowed foreign
investors to invest in Indian companies in almost all sectors,
were opened up to foreign investors, the foreign direct invest-
ment regime was liberalised very slowly, sector by sector.
The second phase of capital account decontrol thus involved in-
ward ows of FDI and portfolio equity investment. Signicant
values for these rst showed up for the 1991-1995 period. Both
have grown strongly in the following years, with 2.49 per cent of
GDP coming in through FDI and 1.25 per cent of GDP coming
in through portfolio investment, in the 2006-2010 period.
The third phase of capital account decontrol involved giving per-
missions to Indian companies to do overseas FDI. This yielded
signicant outows of 0.32 and 1.34 per cent of GDP in the
2001-2005 and 2006-2010 period. While there has been some
easing of the rules about outbound investment by individuals,
the magnitudes involved have been miniscule.
Overall, net capital inows were at roughly 2 per cent of GDP
7or below this all the way to 1990. After this, net capital inows
have largely risen consistently to an average of 4.55 per cent of
GDP in the 2006-2010 period. In all components other than aid,
the largest values for net capital inow (or outow) are seen in
the 2006-2010 period.
In summary, in terms of the distinction between portfolio ows
and FDI, in India's case, capital account integration with the
world economy was dominated by portfolio ows. FDI inows
remained small in the early period while portfolio ows took o.
Much later, when FDI ows showed a sharp rise, two-thirds or
more of these ows were accounted for by foreign private equity
funds, who are nancial investors, with decision making that is
clearly linked to the stock market in terms of valuations and
prospects of exit. Hence, the majority of what is reported as
`FDI inows' into India actually reects nancial globalisation.
India is thus unusual among emerging markets in having capital
account integration dominated by the process of domestic rms
accessing foreign capital through both portfolio investment into
listed equity and investments into unlisted rms by private eq-
uity funds.
With both trade and capital account liberalisation, the opening
of the economy has taken place gradually. As emphasised above,
measures of trade and capital account integration showed sub-
tantial change from roughly 2000 onwards. This reected a com-
bination of policy gradualism, and the numerous areas in which
institutional change was required as a concomitant of opening
the economy.
2.2 Internationalisation of rms
Firm internationalisation lies at the centre of India's engage-
ment with nancial globalisation. There is sharp evidence of
internationalisation at the rm level. Five dimensions of inter-
nationalisation can be examined:
81. A rm could import, thus buying raw materials and/or
capital goods from foreign providers;
2. A rm could export;
3. A rm could obtain equity capital from external sources;
4. A rm could obtain debt capital from external sources
(whether local-currency denominated or foreign-currency
denominated);
5. A rm could expand overseas, thus placing foreign assets
on its balance sheet.
In order to describe the extent of internationalisation of Indian
rms, we dene four categories:
None 0 percent
Low Between 0 percent and 10 percent
Medium Between 10 percent and 50 percent
High Above 50 percent
Using information from the CMIE database, we classify all large
Indian rms into one of these four categories in all the four
dimensions.1
Table 2 approaches internationalisation of Indian rms by re-
porting the fraction of aggregate rm size in each category. For
our purposes, size is dened as the average of rm sales and
total assets.
In 2001-02, 64 percent of total rms size involved corporations
importing in the Medium or High categories. By 2008-09, this
had risen to 66 per cent, a rise of 2 per cent. With exports,
in 2001-02, 15 per cent of this mass was in either Medium or
High. By 2008-09, the total rm size with export intensity in
1In 2001-02, there were 6,575 listed rms in India and in 2007-08 there
were 6,268 listed rms.
9Table 2: Internationalisation of India's listed rms
Percentage of total mass of all listed companies
2001-02 2008-09
None Low Med. High None Low Med. High
Imports 5.31 30.70 48.26 15.71 5.99 27.53 51.45 15.01
Exports 56.63 28.33 11.39 3.63 53.84 26.12 11.83 8.21
Foreign equity 22.27 37.33 36.72 3.66 3.70 33.99 56.56 5.74
Foreign borrowing 46.39 14.63 23.66 15.31 25.63 20.14 33.47 20.74
Overseas assets 60.29 39.04 0.45 0.21 43.49 50.00 5.17 1.32
Source: CMIE Prowess database.
the Medium-High categories had risen to 20 per cent, a rise of 5
per cent. With both these trade-based measures, the change in
international economic integration over this period was small.
While the macroeconomic data on trade integration shows a
sharp rise over this period, this data for large rms does not
show a sharp change.
Large changes are, however, visible across this period with mea-
sures of nancial internationalisation. In 2001-02, 40 per cent
of the mass of Indian rms had either Medium or High equity
investment. By 2008-09, this stood at 62 per cent: a sharp rise
of 22 percentage points.
With foreign borrowing, in 2001-02, rms accounting for 39 per
cent of the mass were in either Medium or High categories. In
2008-09, this had risen to 54 per cent { despite the stated policy
of the government in aiming to deter debt inows. Finally, with
overseas assets, less than 1 per cent of Indian rms had either
Medium or High overseas assets in 2001-02. By 2008-09, the
number of Indian rms with Medium or High overseas assets
had risen sharply to 6 per cent. Over half the mass of rms had
non-zero outbound FDI.
A natural area of exploration lies in the interplay of internation-
alisation and nancing constraints. An early literature found
that the domestic nancial system, and particularly the equity
10market, was sensitive to exporting status. Exporting rms faced
reduced nancing constraints. However, this evidence is based
on the early 1990s, while the large changes in internationalisa-
tion of rm nancing took place after 2000. These questions,
hence, lie largely unexplored.
3 Foreign portfolio investment in the
equity market
In the early 1990s, India opened investment into listed equi-
ties through the `FII framework'. This involved the following
key elements. Some, but not all, foreign investors were eligi-
ble to register with the Indian securities regulator (SEBI). Once
registered, FIIs could buy shares in India without quantitative
restrictions, or constraints on repatriation. No one FII was per-
mitted to own more than 5 per cent of a rm, and there were
weak restrictions on the ownership by all FIIs taken together.
One response of global nancial rms to the Indian FII frame-
work has been the rise of a market for `participatory notes',
which are OTC derivatives on Indian underlyings which are
traded oshore. A handful of global rms are book-runners on
this market. A foreigner who is not a registered FII with the
Indian authorities is able to transact on the PN market. The
book-runners then hedge their net exposures of the book using
the onshore market, to which they have access by virtue of being
registered FIIs in India. One factor which has encouraged the
use of PNs is the presence of transaction taxes on the onshore
market, while PN transactions avoid these.
As the home bias literature has emphasised, there are many
sources of home bias, and capital controls is only one element
of these. In the event, when India embarked on a limited easing
of capital controls against equity inows, the home bias of for-
eign investors did not strongly change in response. Many other
11sources of home bias remained in place, including asymmetric
information, capability of the domestic nancial system, a lim-
ited number of listed rms of adequate size from the viewpoint
of international investors, etc.
The desire of policy makers to encourage foreign investors in the
Indian equity market, in the early 1990s, helped in reopening
long-standing policy questions about the equity market. For-
eign investors faced many diculties in accomplishing transac-
tions in the Indian equity market. As an example, in August
and September 1993, the settlement system (which was based
on physical paper share certicates) found it dicult to handle
the settlement volume of foreign investors. Similarly, foreign in-
vestors who sent orders to the open outcry trading oor of the
Bombay Stock Exchange found an array of problems including
high transactions costs and low probability of order execution.
A rst response of many Indian rms was to issue in New York
or London through GDRs and ADRs, thus using the institu-
tional capability of these nancial systems, and bypassing the
inrmities of the domestic nancial system. In the early 1990s,
there was a sharp increase in this issuance.
When faced with similar conditions, many other developing coun-
tries have experienced a hollowing out of domestic nancial in-
termediation. When a weak domestic nancial system is dicult
to reform for political reasons, domestic rms tend to interact
with foreign investors in international nancial centres like New
York or London, leading to a shift in nancial intermediation to
oshore venues.
In the Indian case, from 1993 to 2001, the Ministry of Finance
and SEBI led a strong reforms eort aiming at a fundamental
transformation of the equity market. The changes on the equity
market from December 1993 to June 2001 helped to increase liq-
uidity, reduce risk, improve disclosure and increase the number
of investors and trades in the market. These reforms led to a
shift in the focus of foreign investors away from Indian securi-
12ties traded in London or New York, and the primary markets
for India-related equities trading became the NSE and BSE in
Bombay.
These changes addressed one important source of home bias {
the deciencies of nancial development in emerging markets
{ and were associated with a decline in home bias by foreign
investors against investing in India. In 1991, the weight of Indian
equities in the portfolio of international investors was zero. In
the rst decade of India's opening, this share rose to only 0.04
per cent, reecting a largely unchanged extent of home bias
against India. By 2007, there was a six-fold rise in this weight
to 0.24 per cent, suggesting an easing (though not elimination)
of home bias.
While India obtained signicant nancial development and cap-
ital account decontrol on the equity market, neither of these
changes took place with the bond market and banks. In the same
period, rms undertook strong deleveraging through emphasis
on equity nancing: the debt-equity ratio of large non-nancial
rms dropped sharply from 1.7 in 1991 to 0.7 in 2007. There
may be a causal relationship here: when rms faced greater
nancing constraints on bond- or bank-nancing alongside re-
duced nancing constraints for equity nancing, they may have
shifted in favour of greater equity nancing. Consequently, while
the share of foreign investors in equity rose sharply, in the bond
markets it remained limited. Further there were regulatory caps
on the stock of holdings of government bond by foreign investors.
Corporate bonds were allowed to be held by foreign institutional
investors only after 2004.
3.1 Concerns about herding behaviour
One major concern among policy circles has been of an en masse
exit by a herd of foreign investors in a crisis. However, with
thousands of foreign investors in India, there have been het-
13Table 3: Did FIIs exit en masse at times of domestic stress?
Percent to mkt. capn.
Event T-1 T T+1
Parliament attack  0.015 0.012  0.015
12-12-2001
Gujarat riots 0.020 0.025  0.0001
27-02-2002
UPA government  0.029  0.060  0.050
13-05-2004
Mumbai attacks 0.015 NA 0.015
26-11-2008
Source: Sinha (2010)
erogeneous views, and in each crisis, some foreigners have been
buying while others have been selling.
Table 3 shows information about net FII inows on the equity
market in four recent episodes of market stress. In each of them,
relatively small values are seen for the net sales by FIIs. The
largest values in the table involve net sales of 0.11 percent of
market capitalisation on the event date (`T') and the following
day (`T+1') associated with the formation of the UPA govern-
ment in 2004. The scenario of massive sales by foreigners when
India is experiencing diculties does not t the evidence we
examined.
In the literature on nancial globalisation and emerging markets,
there have been concerns about the limited knowledge with for-
eign investors, which (in turn) leads to behaviour such as herd-
ing, sudden capital ow reversals, etc. In the Indian experience
on the equity market, the behaviour of foreign investors has been
benign.
The exploration of the factors underlying this dierence is im-
portant. India's path in capital account liberalisation { with
no quantitative restrictions, access to the Indian market for a
large number of heterogeneous foreign investors, and with the
ability of foreign securities rms to operate in Indian nancial
14markets { has also been conducive to long-term investments by
foreign nancial rms in building teams which understand India.
For a contrast, India's rules on foreign investment into rupee-
denominated bonds are inimical to the construction of teams
and knowledge among foreign investors.
The presence of thousands of heterogenous foreign investors of
many kinds { ranging from pension funds to hedge funds { has
helped shield the economy from the liquidity motivated orders
emanating from any one group of investors in distress or facing
correlated regulatory compulsions. The early opening of the cap-
ital account, where it was believed that only certain kinds of for-
eign investors should be permitted, induced homogeneity of for-
eign investors. However, incremental reform of capital controls
has steadily increased the heterogeneity of the investor base.
The size and prominence of India in the world economy may have
helped in giving foreign investors adequate incentives to obtain
information and understanding about India. In these respects,
India has a natural advantage in engaging with globalisation
when compared with smaller countries.
4 The role of FDI
4.1 Inbound FDI
India opened up slowly to FDI in the 1990s. The limits on the
share of foreign ownership was slowly increased in every sector.
By 2000, while most sectors were open upto 100 percent, sectors
where FDI was restricted include retail trading (except single
brand product retailing), atomic energy, and betting. Table 4
shows the areas where FDI caps exist.
While inbound FDI investors have the ability to repatriate cap-
ital, so far, in the Indian experience, this reverse ow of capital
15Sector Limit on foreign ownership (per cent)
Areas where restrictions exist
Airlines 49
Atomic minerals 74
Asset Reconstruction Companies 49
Banking 74
Broadcasting 20 / 26/ 49/100
Defence 26
Insurance 26




Single brand retailing 51
Satellites establishment and operation 74
All other sectors 100
Source: Foreign Direct Investment Policy, April 2006, Department of Industrial
Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce & Industry.
Table 4: Sectoral FDI limits
has been tiny. As an example, in 2006-07, it was 0.01% of GDP.
Hence, for all practical purposes, inbound FDI has been a one-
way process of capital coming into the country.
When compared with other emerging markets, India has at-
tracted relatively little FDI. The rst phase of nancial glob-
alisation primarily involved Indian rms obtaining equity and
debt capital from abroad, thus achieving a reduction in the cost
of capital. This bolstered the competitive position of Indian
rms competing against foreign companies producing in India
through FDI and competing in global markets by exporting.
The easing of capital controls, coupled with strong investment
opportunities in India, gave a strong rise in FDI ows into India:
from 0.14% of GDP in 1992-93 to 0.53% in 1999-2000 and then
to 2.34% of GDP in 2006-07.
From April 2000 to August 2007, $44 billion came into India
through FDI. In terms of the country composition, the bulk of
16Country Value Share








Total (all countries) 44.4 100
Table 5: Country composition of FDI (April 2000 { August
2007)
Sector Value Share
(Billion USD) (Per cent)
Services 8.1 20.6
Computer hardware and software 6.2 16.0
Telecom 3.5 8.7
Automobiles 1.7 8.7
Construction including roads 2.1 5.2
Electricity 1.3 3.4
Total (all industries) 44.4 100
Table 6: Sectoral composition of inbound FDI (April 2000 {
August 2007)
FDI into India came in from Mauritius: the reason for this is
that India has a preferential tax treaty with Mauritius.
Services, nancial and non-nancial, attracted the highest amount
of FDI. Between April 2000 to August 2007 USD 8 billion, or
20.6 percent of all FDI ows, came into the services sector. Next
was computer software and hardware which attracted 16 percent
of ows. Telecom (8.7%), automobile industry(8.7%) , construc-
tion (5.2%) and power (3.4%) came next.
When FDI into India did rise signicantly from 2002 onwards,
as much as two-thirds of this FDI took the form of foreign pri-
vate equity funds buying large stakes in Indian unlisted compa-
17nies. This phenomenon can also be interpreted as foreign capital
bolstering the competitive position of Indian rms competing
against foreign companies producing in India through FDI.
This experience can be located in the debates about `FDI as
bad cholesterol' literature, where foreign portfolio investment is
seen as a bigger accomplishment by an emerging market. FDI
requires little institutional capability, while foreign portfolio in-
vestment requires high quality rms, domestic nancial devel-
opment, and capabilities in the legal and regulatory system.
5 Foreign borrowing
In the international literature and in policy thinking amongst
emerging markets, the question of currency exposure has come
to prominence. When the exchange rate regime gives out expec-
tations of low currency risk, rms and governments are encour-
aged to borrow in foreign currency. Once currency mismatches
are present, when large depreciations take place, this generates
considerable distress.
Indian capital controls have been biased against foreign borrow-
ing and particularly against short-dated foreign borrowing. This
policy framework does not reect an appreciation of issues of
currency exposure. Strong restrictions are in place against FII
investment in rupee-denominated bonds, while a much larger
scale of oshore borrowing in foreign currency takes place. This
policy framework has encouraged unhedged currency by rms,
particularly in periods when the exchange rate regime involved
greater pegging.
These issues came to prominence in 2008, when exchange rate
volatility rose, a sharp depreciation took place, and the global
credit market experienced turbulence. This had an adverse im-
pact on the balance sheets of many Indian rms, particularly
those which had borrowed abroad. The experiences of this pe-
18riod emphasised the weaknesses of India's policy positions on
the three issues of original sin, the lack of development of the
domestic bond market and the lack of development of a domestic
banking system.
6 Eectiveness of capital controls and
the exchange rate regime
India has an elaborate system of administrative capital controls.
Rules dier according to investor classes, the markets operated
in and the assets bought or sold. This implies that capital con-
trols involve a number of institutions and regulators. Apart
from the Government of India, capital ows are regulated by
the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities and Exchange Board
of India, the Forward Markets Commission, the Insurance Reg-
ulatory and Development Authority, and the Pension Fund Reg-
ulatory and Development Authority. Within the Government of
India, the Ministry of Finance deals with portfolio investment,
and the Ministry of Commerce with foreign direct investment
policy.
The legal powers to regulate capital ows also emanate from a
number of laws. Capital ows are regulated by the Reserve Bank
of India under the powers it has through the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999. Reserve Bank of India is authorized
to manage transactions and capital ows in consultation with
the Ministry of Finance. In addition, the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949, and the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and Reserve
Bank of India Amendment Act of 2006 which also provide the
Reserve Bank of India with the authority to regulate capital
ows.
The Acts then work through regulations, circulars and clari-
cations. One, the Reserve Bank of India articulates policy
with regard to capital account transactions through regulations.
19These must be placed before Parliament. Further there are no-
tications. These require publication in the ocial gazette. In
addition the Reserve Bank of India issues circulars, master cir-
culars and clarications.
The critical question in this eld is: Are India's capital controls
suciently onerous and suciently eective to give monetary
policy autonomy alongside exchange rate pegging? Or does the
pursuit of pegging set o distortions of monetary policy, which
could then force a shift away from pegging?
Across time, three factors are giving greater de facto openness:
the gradual pace of de jure capital account liberalisation, the
increasing sophistication of rms including their conversion into
multinationals, and the increasing capability of the domestic
nancial system through which nancial engineering can be un-
dertaken to bypass capital controls. As an example, positions
on equities and options can be combined to achieve synthetic
corporate bonds, thus frustrating capital controls against debt
positions.
Some evidence using rm data suggests that the eectiveness
of the capital controls is relatively limited. The rst dimen-
sion of this evidence lies in the exchange rate exposure of rms.
Capital controls in India have strong restrictions against dollar-
denominated borrowing. If these controls were eective, rms
should not be able to take on substantial currency exposure.
However, the analysis of the currency exposure of rms shows
rms were able to take on and lay o substantial exposures to
the dollar (in response to the extent of exchange rate pegging).
This suggests that the eectiveness of capital controls against
dollar denominated borrowing was limited.
The second dimension of this is the episode where Lehman failed
in September 2008. Indian capital controls do not allow rms to
take foreign currency loans of maturity less than 3 years. Under
a null hypothesis that India's de jure capital controls were fully
eective, India should have been quite disconnected from the
20Start End R2 USD EUR GBP JPY Variance
1 11 Jan '91 28 Jan '94 0.84 0.94 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.45
(19.52) (0.12) (-0.11) (-1.03)
2 4 Feb '94 24 Feb '95 1.00 1.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.01
(77.35) (-3.14) (-1.11) (1.79)
3 3 Mar '95 21 Aug '98 0.71 0.85 0.08 -0.00 0.08 0.52
(13.22) (0.68) (-0.04) (2.08)
4 28 Aug '98 19 Mar '04 0.97 0.98 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.06
(67.30) (3.52) (-0.59) (1.32)
5 26 Mar '04 16 Mar '07 0.86 0.75 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.24
(18.85) (2.04) (1.73) (5.46)
6 23 Mar '07 25 Dec '09 0.62 0.73 0.34 0.04 -0.12 0.87
(9.72) (3.06) (0.66) (-2.31)
Table 7: Evolution of the Indian exchange rate regime
global crisis, given that rms were prohibited from engaging in
short-term foreign borrowing. However, in the event, the Indian
money market was thrown into turmoil, and the operating pro-
cedures of monetary policy broke down, despite a modest 1% of
GDP of an exit by foreign portfolio investors in the immediate
aftermath of the Lehman default.
The third dimension of this lies in the analysis of the onshore
premium on currency forwards compared with that seen abroad
on the NDF market. Over the years, mispricings between these
have been arbitraged away more eectively, suggesting increas-
ing de facto openness.
To the extent that capital controls are not eective, when mon-
etary policy pursues a pegged exchange rate, signicant distor-
tions of monetary policy should build up. Hence, we examine
structural change of the Indian exchange rate regime.
The rupee dollar exchange rate was administered by the RBI
till 1993. After that the de jure exchange rate regime was de-
clared a managed oat. However, de facto currency regime was
a peg to the US dollar. Details of the exchange rate regime can
21be seen in Table 7. This reports estimation results of the ex-
change rate regression, where a numeraire (the Swiss franc) is
chosen. The regression explains weekly percentage changes in
the rupee-franc rate, and the explanatory variables are weekly
percentage changes of the USD/CHF rate, the EUR/CHF rate,
the GBP/CHF rate and the JPY/CHF rate. These parameter
estimates show how tight the USD peg was. If there is pegging
to the USD, then uctuations in the GBP, JPY and EUR will be
irrelevant, and we will observe 3 = 4 = 5 = 0 while 2 = 1.
The coecient reveals the tightness of the peg to the USD. The
R2 of this regression shows the degree of exibility. Values near
1 suggest lower exchange rate exibility.
Structural change econometrics is used to identify dates of struc-
tural change. Hence, Table 7 shows the evolution of the ex-
change rate regime.
In Period 1, which started in January 1991, the only signicant
coecient in Period 1 was that of the USD, and there was high
inexibility with an R2 of 0.84. After an IMF program, India
embarked on a reform of the exchange rate regime, to a `market
determined exchange rate'. In Period 2, the R2 actually went to
1.0, showing a shift to a xed rate. The implementation of the
exchange rate regime in Period 2, which involved unsterilised
intervention, was associated with signicant monetary policy
distortions and helped kick o an upsurge in ination.
The rst experience with exibility came in Period 3, in the
Asian crisis, where the R2 dropped to 0.71. In this period, there
was a small Yen coecient but the focus remained the US dollar.
In January 1998, an interest rate defence of the exchange rate
was mounted, with a 200 bps rise in the short rate despite weak
business cycle conditions.
Once the Asian crisis subsided, pegging to the dollar recom-
menced with an R2 of 0.97 in Period 4. This was a period of
sterilised intervention, where large purchases of dollars were ac-
companied by sale of government bonds. In December 2003, the
22stock of domestic government bonds was exhausted, and this
period soon come to an end.
Slighly greater exibility came about in Period 5, with an R2
of 0.86. In this period, an unprecedented scale of currency in-
tervention was accompanied by only partial sterilisation. This
kicked o the largest ever credit boom in Indian history.
Finally, Period 6 shows the largest ever exibility in the history
of India's exchange rate regime, with an R2 of 0.62. This reects
a combination of unusual turbulence in 2008, and a reduced scale
of intervention by the central bank.
If Indian capital controls were eective and India was largely
closed on the capital account, this complex interplay between
the exchange rate regime and monetary policy autonomy would
not have arisen. India would have been able to pursue exchange
rate pegging without attendant distortions of monetary policy.
However, as this evidence shows, the pursuit of pegging has re-
peatedly induced substantial monetary policy distortions. Two
periods of near-xed rates stand out: Period 2 and Period 4.
After the end of Period 4 in 2004, there has been signicant
movement towards greater exchange rate exibility. This is con-
sistent with an environment of relatively ineective capital con-
trols, and signicant de facto openness.
The `Bretton-Woods II' hypothesis predicts that countries like
India should pursue exchange rate mercantalism with central
banks building up foreign exchange reserves so as to undervalue
the exchange rate. In the 19 years of experience summarised
in Table 7, there are two periods where India's behaviour t
these predictions: Period 2 (1 year) and Period 4 (5.5 years).
These add up to a third of India's experience. The Indian case,
hence, does not support the Bretton Woods II proposition, that
exchange rate undervaluation through currency intervention is
a stable and sustainable solution for developing countries.
237 Domestic nance and international
nance
Some emerging markets have experienced a signicant shift of
nancial market activity to international nancial centres. By
and large, this has not taken place in India.
In the equity market, for a handful of ADRs, liquidity in the
US exceeds that found in India. In certain kinds of OTC in-
terest rate derivatives, the oshore market is bigger than the
onshore market. Looking across the nancial system, the do-
mestic nancial system is the dominant venue, apart from two
exceptions (some kinds of OTC interest rate derivatives and a
few ADRs).
Bombay is also starting to become an international nancial
centre in some respects. Some elements of nancial services
production by global rms is being done in India (mostly in
Bombay) through oshoring. A rst `Indian Depository Receipt'
listing has taken place.
Improvements in domestic nancial development, and in the ca-
pabilities of domestic nancial regulation, are likely to induce a
stronger position for domestic nancial intermediation and for
Bombay as an international nancial centre. In addition, three
key factors will shape this evolution: increased de facto open-
ness, domestic home bias and the tax treatment of international
nance.
Domestic nancial intermediation has held its ground owing to
successful nancial development in some areas. However, one
factor which has assisted this is the system of capital controls.
As an example, onshore customers of index futures are forced
to use the onshore Nifty futures, and are unable to send orders
abroad (to either the SGX-traded or the CME-traded futures
on Nifty). Increased de facto openness will reduce the extent to
which the domestic nancial system enjoys this protectionist ad-
24vantage. If changes in de facto openness are large, and progress
on domestic nancial development are weak, then a hollowing
out of domestic nancial intermediation could arise, as has taken
place with many other countries.
A second key element of this lies in tax treatment of interna-
tional nance. The Indian tax regime on these questions involves
two key elements. First, there is a source-based tax treatment
including a securities transactions tax. Second, once foreign
investors route their investments into India through Mauritius,
they get a residence-based treatment (i.e. exemption of taxation
of non-residents) except for the securities transaction tax.
Source-based taxation is inimical to onshore nancial interme-
diation. When India imposes taxes on non-resident nancial
activity in India, non-residents have an incentive to send orders
on India-related contracts to venues such as Singapore, Lon-
don and New York, all of which have residence-based taxation.
Hence, until India gets to a framework of residence-based taxa-
tion, and particularly if India removes or modies the Mauritius
tax treaty, there is a risk of a hollowing out of domestic nancial
intermediation.
The third key element lies in domestic home bias. The portfolios
of Indian residents and Indian portfolio managers are strongly
tilted in favour of India. This reects a combination of informa-
tion asymmetries and capital controls. Banks, pension funds and
insurance companies have no international diversication. To
the extent that this home bias is alleviated, the large ow of In-
dian savings could attract international issuers. This could bol-
ster onshore nancial intermediation through issuance of shares
and bonds in India.
In summary, so far, domestic nancial intermediation has held
up well, except for a handful of ADRs and some kinds of OTC
interest rate derivatives, where an oshore market has greater
liquidity than the onshore market. Bombay is in the early stages
of becoming an international nancial centre, through the tradi-
25tional route (e.g. equity issuance by global companies in Bom-
bay) and through a new and non-traditional route (some parts
of global nancial services production taking place in Bombay).
But these relationships between domestic nance and interna-
tional nance could uctuate based on the four factors:
1. The extent to which domestic nancial regulation improves,
which would attract onshore activity,
2. Oshore nance will be able to better compete with on-
shore nance owing to deepening de facto openness. Hence,
onshore nance will lose ground unless domestic nancial
regulation improves.
3. The extent to which India is able to shift to a residence-
based framework for taxation, which is essential for ensur-
ing that foreign order ow comes to India, and
4. The extent to which the home bias of Indian portfolios
is diminished, which would help to attract international
securities issuance in India.
8 Policy questions about capital con-
trols and monetary policy
India has evolved a complex system of capital controls. If a
single capital controls manual were released by the government,
it would run to thousands of pages of detailed rules. As in other
areas of public policy, complex and detailed systems of rules
have many problems.
The rst concern lies in the extent to which the rule makers
are omniscient. As an example, India's positions on foreign bor-
rowing are out of touch with contemporary economic thinking
in terms of blocking the onshore rupee-denominated bond mar-
ket in favour of oshore foreign-currency borrowing. Many other
26microeconomic distortions are visible, where a sophisticated pri-
vate sector maximises given the ruleset, giving unintended con-
sequences in the form of microeconomic distortions.
The second issue is the transactions costs associated with cap-
ital controls. Bureaucrats, lawyers and accountants lead to an
increased time and cost of undertaking transactions when com-
pared with that seen in a simpler system. Reforms which remove
these deadweight costs would give benets. In addition, in the
optimisation of the private sector, these xed costs are justied
for large transactions but not for small transactions. Hence, the
Indian system of capital controls is biased in favour of giving
large rms greater access to the international nancial system.
Third, there is more de facto openness than meets the eye.
While India appears largely closed at rst, the ingenuity of -
nancial engineering coupled with legal engineering implies that
for a suciently large expenditure of time and fees, many trans-
actions are feasible. If India were largely closed, then the pursuit
of exchange rate pegging would not have induced large mone-
tary policy distortions. If India were largely closed, the failure
of Lehman would not have triggered o a breakdown of the op-
erating procedures of Indian monetary policy, despite a lack of
exit by foreign investors.
These three issues will shape the policy analysis of the Indian
system of capital controls. The second important group of policy
questions concerns monetary policy. As India's capital account
openness has deepened, the pursuit of exchange rate pegging
would imply an increased loss of control of monetary policy. In
response to this, exchange rate exibility has risen, with the R2
of the Frankel-Wei regression going down from 1.0 in Period 2
to 0.62 in Period 6.
However, all the changes of the exchange rate regime shown in
Table 7 other than Period 2 were made without announcement
by the central bank. This raises questions about the goals and
operational procedures of monetary policy. What public state-
27ments would be made about the exchange rate regime? Since
a oating exchange rate is not a monetary policy regime, what
is the best use of the lever of monetary policy, once autonomy
has been regained through shifting away from exchange rate
pegging? What framework for accountability and transparency
should be employed for the central bank, once the central bank
is not held accountable for achieving an exchange rate target?
If monetary policy clearly moves away from the pursuit of ex-
change rate pegging, then would this clear the decks for simpli-
cation of the system of capital account restrictions, and de jure
openness?
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